Tenancy Rent Control and Credible Commitment in Maintenance

Arbeitspapier

Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. This paper investigates the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality and maintenance. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to “show” it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The paper formalizes this intuition and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4608

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Housing Demand ; Housing Supply and Markets ; Production Analysis and Firm Location: Government Policy
• Thema: tenancy rent control ; rent control ; maintenance ; housing quality ; credible commitment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Arnott, Richard J. ; Shevyakhova, Elizaveta
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93393
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ