Innovation Contests

Arbeitspapier

We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the innovation. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings where these conditions are satisfied.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4712

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Auctions ; Labor Discrimination
• Subject: contests ; auctions ; innovation ; discrimination

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96903
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET