Arbeitspapier
Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?
Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 60.2007
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
-
Environmental Policy
Linking
Folk Theorem
Tensor Game
Prsioners' Dilemma
Full Cooperation
Pareto Efficiency
Minkowski Sum
Vector Maximum
Convex Analysis
Wiederholte Spiele
Umweltpolitik
Folk-Theorem
Gefangenendilemma
Pareto-Optimum
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
von Mouche, Pierre
Folmer, Henk
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- von Mouche, Pierre
- Folmer, Henk
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2007
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