Arbeitspapier
Bidding for Nothing? The Pitfalls of overly Neutral Framing
Neutral framing is a standard tool of experimental economics. However, overly neutral instructions, which lack any contextual clues, can lead to strange behavior. In a contextless second price auction for a meaningless good, a majority of subjects enter positive bids - a case of cognitive experimenter demand effect. Subjects bid positive amounts because this is what they think they are tasked with in the experiment. Adding a second auction that has a context drastically reduces the positive bids in the meaningless first auction by reducing the cognitive experimenter demand effect.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 14-063/I
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Auctions
- Thema
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Context
Neutral Framing
Experimenter Demand Effect
Experiment
Second-Price Auction
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dürsch, Peter
Muller, Julia
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
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2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dürsch, Peter
- Muller, Julia
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2014