Arbeitspapier

Heterogeneity in rent-seeking contests with multiple stages: Theory and experimental evidence

This paper investigates how heterogeneity in contestants' investment costs affects the competition intensity in a dynamic elimination contest. Theory predicts that the absolute level of investment costs has no effect on the competition intensity in homogeneous interactions. Relative cost differences in heterogeneous interactions, however, reduce equilibrium expenditures. Evidence from lab experiments for treatments with homogeneous participants is qualitatively in line with the theoretical prediction. The effect of cost differences on expenditures is positive rather than negative, however, in all heterogeneous treatments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2013-29

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
Multi-Stage Contest
Heterogeneity
Experiment
Joy of Winning

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hörtnagl, Tanja
Kerschbamer, Rudolf
Stracke, Rudi
Sunde, Uwe
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
(wo)
Innsbruck
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hörtnagl, Tanja
  • Kerschbamer, Rudolf
  • Stracke, Rudi
  • Sunde, Uwe
  • University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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