Arbeitspapier
Optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority
Price dynamics are characterized when a price-fixing cartel is concerned about creating suspicions of the presence of a cartel A dynamical extension of static models yields the counterfactual prediction that the cartel initially raises price and then gradually lowers it An alternative specification generates a more plausible result that the cartel gradually raises price For that specification the long-run cartel price is found to be decreasing in the damage multiple but is independent of the level of fixed fines A more stringent standard for calculating damages is shown to induce the cartel to price higher
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 460
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Collusion
Cartel Detection
Antitrust
Kartell
Betriebliche Preispolitik
Konzentrationspolitik
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Harrington, Joseph E.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Baltimore, MD
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Harrington, Joseph E.
- The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2001
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The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing
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Lower Sanctions, Greater Antitrust Compliance? Cartel Conduct with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk
When does a self-serving antitrust authority act in society's best interests?
Quantification of Harm in Damages Actions for Antitrust Infringements: Insights from German Cartel Cases
Cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority
Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination
Post-cartel pricing during litigation
Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs
The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing
Private antitrust enforcement revisited : the role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority [[Elektronische Ressource]]
Pricing Behavior of Cartel Outsiders in Incomplete Cartels
The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing
Lower sanctions, greater antitrust compliance? Cartel conduct with imperfect information about enforcement risk
Lower Sanctions, Greater Antitrust Compliance? Cartel Conduct with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk
When does a self-serving antitrust authority act in society's best interests?