The Role of Toeholds and Capital Gain Taxes for Corporate Acquisition Strategies

Konferenzbeitrag

Ownership takeovers often follow complex strategies where the control of the target firm is acquired through a sequence of independent contracts. We study the role of capital gain taxes on the contract structure and on the method of finance of merger and acquisitions (M&As). We find that capital gain taxes discourage cash-to-stock transactions and that this effect is stronger in sequential acquisitions. In addition, we show that capital gain taxes promote sequential acquisitions and thus carry a beneficial welfare effect by avoiding the waste of productive resources due to unprofitable mergers. We provide empirical support for the model predictions by estimating a bivariate probit on a sample of acquisition contracts collected from the Thomson Financial SDC database.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Financial Economics IV ; No. D10-V1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Stimmelmayr, Michael ; Liberini, Federica ; Russo, Antonio
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112926
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ