Arbeitspapier

Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micor- and macroprudential concerns

Supervisors sometimes have to manage both the micro- and macro- prudential dimensions of bank stability. These may either conflict or complement each other. We analyze prudential supervision by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). We find evidence of micro-prudential concerns, measured as the rule-based enforcement of bank standards. Macro-prudential concerns are also documented: Banks in concentrated bank markets, large banks, money center banks and large deposit banks are less likely to face license withdrawal. Further, the CBR is reluctant to withdraw licenses when there are 'too many banks to fail'. Finally, macro-prudential concerns induce regulatory forbearance, revealing conflicts with micro-prudential objectives.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 205

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
prudential supervision
bank stability
systemic stability
Bankenaufsicht
Finanzsystem
Bankenliquidität
Russland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Claeys, Sophie
Schoors, Koen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sveriges Riksbank
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Claeys, Sophie
  • Schoors, Koen
  • Sveriges Riksbank

Entstanden

  • 2007

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