Arbeitspapier

Targeting Inflation with a Prominent Role for Money

This paper demonstrates how a target for money growth can be beneficial for an inflation targeting central bank acting under discretion. Because the growth rate of money is closely related to the change in the interest rate and he growth of real output, delegating a money growth target to the central bank makes discretionary policy more inertial, leading to better social outcomes. This delegation scheme is also compared with other schemes suggested in the literature. Although other delegation schemes are sometimes more efficient, the results indicate that giving a prominent role to a money growth indicator can be a sensible strategy for monetary policy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 123

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Demand for Money
Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Thema
Discretion
commitment
monetary policy inertia
inflation targeting
monetary targeting

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Söderström, Ulf
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sveriges Riksbank
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Söderström, Ulf
  • Sveriges Riksbank

Entstanden

  • 2001

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