Arbeitspapier

Targeting Inflation with a Prominent Role for Money

This paper demonstrates how a target for money growth can be beneficial for an inflation targeting central bank acting under discretion. Because the growth rate of money is closely related to the change in the interest rate and he growth of real output, delegating a money growth target to the central bank makes discretionary policy more inertial, leading to better social outcomes. This delegation scheme is also compared with other schemes suggested in the literature. Although other delegation schemes are sometimes more efficient, the results indicate that giving a prominent role to a money growth indicator can be a sensible strategy for monetary policy.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 123

Classification
Wirtschaft
Demand for Money
Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Subject
Discretion
commitment
monetary policy inertia
inflation targeting
monetary targeting

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Söderström, Ulf
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sveriges Riksbank
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Söderström, Ulf
  • Sveriges Riksbank

Time of origin

  • 2001

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