Strategic Choice Handicaps when Females Pay the Cost of the Handicap

Arbeitspapier

We examine a strategic-choice handicap model in which males send costly signals to advertise their quality to females. Females are concerned with the net viability of the male with whom they mate, where net viability is a function of the male's quality and signal. We identify circumstances in which a signaling equilibrium would require high-quality males to send signals so much larger than those of males in lower quality (to deter mimicry by the latter) as to yield lower net viabilities for the former. This causes females to shun males who send large signals, ensuring that there is no signaling equilibrium.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 22/2001

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: sexual selection ; handicap principle ; signaling equilibrium ; net viability

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Nöldeke, Georg ; Samuelson, Larry
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2001

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78409
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ