Arbeitspapier
All-pay auctions with handicaps
This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a 'piecewise affine transformation' of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction without handicaps. The paper also discusses the allocation rule implemented in the equilibrium and provides a comparison of revenue.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 781
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
asymmetric auctions
all-pay auctions
handicap auctions
Asymmetrische Information
Auktionstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kitahara, Minoru
Ogawa, Ryo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kitahara, Minoru
- Ogawa, Ryo
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2010
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