Arbeitspapier
Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 159
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
Preemptive behavior
rank-order tournaments
sequential tournaments
Agency Theory
Wettbewerb
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Tournament
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jost, Peter-Jürgen
Kräkel, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jost, Peter-Jürgen
- Kräkel, Matthias
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2000
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