Arbeitspapier

A Simple Model of Mergers and Innovation

We analyze the impact of a merger on firms’ incentives to innovate. We show that the merging parties always decrease their innovation efforts post-merger while the outsiders to the merger respond by increasing their effort. A merger tends to reduce overall innovation. Consumers are always worse off after a merger. Our model calls into question the applicability of the “inverted-U” relationship between innovation and competition to a merger setting.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6539

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
Thema
innovation
R&D
mergers

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Federico, Giulio
Langus, Gregor
Valletti, Tommaso M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Federico, Giulio
  • Langus, Gregor
  • Valletti, Tommaso M.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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