Arbeitspapier
A Simple Model of Mergers and Innovation
We analyze the impact of a merger on firms’ incentives to innovate. We show that the merging parties always decrease their innovation efforts post-merger while the outsiders to the merger respond by increasing their effort. A merger tends to reduce overall innovation. Consumers are always worse off after a merger. Our model calls into question the applicability of the “inverted-U” relationship between innovation and competition to a merger setting.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6539
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
- Thema
-
innovation
R&D
mergers
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Federico, Giulio
Langus, Gregor
Valletti, Tommaso M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Federico, Giulio
- Langus, Gregor
- Valletti, Tommaso M.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2017