Arbeitspapier

Detection Biases in Bluffing

Beliefs in signals that reveal lies or truths are widespread. These signals may lead to a truth or lie detection bias if the probability that such a signal is perceived by the receiver is contingent on the truth value of the sender's message. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically in a bluffing game. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which the better a player is at detecting lies the more often the opponent player will lie. With proper deception techniques such biases can in principle be used to extract hidden information.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2008:4

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
Bluffing
Game theory
Truth detection
Lie detection
Detection bias

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Holm, Håkan J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(where)
Lund
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Holm, Håkan J.
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2008

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