Detection Biases in Bluffing

Arbeitspapier

Beliefs in signals that reveal lies or truths are widespread. These signals may lead to a truth or lie detection bias if the probability that such a signal is perceived by the receiver is contingent on the truth value of the sender's message. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically in a bluffing game. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which the better a player is at detecting lies the more often the opponent player will lie. With proper deception techniques such biases can in principle be used to extract hidden information.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2008:4

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Bluffing ; Game theory ; Truth detection ; Lie detection ; Detection bias

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Holm, Håkan J.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/259953
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET