Arbeitspapier
Detection Biases in Bluffing
Beliefs in signals that reveal lies or truths are widespread. These signals may lead to a truth or lie detection bias if the probability that such a signal is perceived by the receiver is contingent on the truth value of the sender's message. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically in a bluffing game. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which the better a player is at detecting lies the more often the opponent player will lie. With proper deception techniques such biases can in principle be used to extract hidden information.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2008:4
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Bluffing
Game theory
Truth detection
Lie detection
Detection bias
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Holm, Håkan J.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Lund
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Holm, Håkan J.
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2008