Arbeitspapier
Detection Biases in Bluffing
Beliefs in signals that reveal lies or truths are widespread. These signals may lead to a truth or lie detection bias if the probability that such a signal is perceived by the receiver is contingent on the truth value of the sender's message. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically in a bluffing game. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which the better a player is at detecting lies the more often the opponent player will lie. With proper deception techniques such biases can in principle be used to extract hidden information.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2008:4
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
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Bluffing
Game theory
Truth detection
Lie detection
Detection bias
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Holm, Håkan J.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Lund
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Holm, Håkan J.
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008