Arbeitspapier

Detection Biases in Bluffing

Beliefs in signals that reveal lies or truths are widespread. These signals may lead to a truth or lie detection bias if the probability that such a signal is perceived by the receiver is contingent on the truth value of the sender's message. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically in a bluffing game. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which the better a player is at detecting lies the more often the opponent player will lie. With proper deception techniques such biases can in principle be used to extract hidden information.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2008:4

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Bluffing
Game theory
Truth detection
Lie detection
Detection bias

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holm, Håkan J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(wo)
Lund
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holm, Håkan J.
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

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