Arbeitspapier

Natural monopoly and distorted competition: Evidence from unbundling fiber-optic networks

Can regulation solve problems arising from a natural monopoly? This paper analyzes whether unbundling, referring to regulations that enforce sharing of natural monopolistic infrastructure, prevents entrants from building new infrastructure. It models and estimates a dynamic entry game to evaluate the effects of regulation, using a dataset for construction of fiber-optic networks in Japan. The counterfactual exercise shows that forced unbundling regulation leads to a 24% decrease in the incidence of new infrastructure builders. This suggests, therefore, that when a new technology is being diffused, regulation to remove a natural monopoly conversely involves risks that regulated monopolists' shares will increase.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2012-26

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Telecommunications
Thema
Market structure and pricing
Productivity

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Minamihashi, Naoaki
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2012

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2012-26
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Minamihashi, Naoaki
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2012

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