Arbeitspapier

An empirical analysis of risk, incentives and the delegation of worker authority

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We address four empirical questions in this paper. Is there empirical support for: 1) the risk-incentives tradeoff predicted by agency theory? 2) a positive relationship between authority and incentives? 3) a positive relationship between risk and authority? 4) the main testable implication of Prendergast’s model, namely that the risk coefficient in an incentives regression should become smaller (i.e. less positive or more negative) when delegation of worker authority is incorporated into the riskincentives regression model? Our empirical results support affirmative answers to all four questions, though in some cases the relevant parameters are estimated with low precision. Thus, our analysis contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence clarifying the relationship between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the delegation of worker decision rights to cope with risk. In particular, we attempt to reconcile the mixed nature of the empirical literature concerning evidence for a riskincentives tradeoff by empirically addressing Prendergast’s extension of the standard principal-agent model.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2011-13

Classification
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Subject
Agency Theory
Risk versus Incentives Tradeoff
Delegation of Worker Authority
Performance Pay

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Devaro, Jed
Kurtulus, Fidan Ana
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
(where)
Amherst, MA
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Devaro, Jed
  • Kurtulus, Fidan Ana
  • University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2011

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