Arbeitspapier

Bank Ownership and Financial Stability

We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions against social welfare, weighted by political accountability.Politicians facing few constraints prefer state control to maximize their rents. As state banks are less efficient, at higher level of accountability there is a shift to private control. At the transition point there is a jumpin risk taking, as private banks do not internalize the social costs of bank failure. To discourage private risk taking, the politician leaves more rentsto private banks.We conclude with some suggestive data complementing existing evidence that financial instability is highest when bank control is capturedby small lobbies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-022/2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Political Economy
Bank Control
Lobbying
Instability
Bankenaufsicht
Privatisierung
Interessenpolitik
Bankenkrise
Wirkungsanalyse
Neue politische Ökonomie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Perotti, Enrico
Vorage, Marcel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Perotti, Enrico
  • Vorage, Marcel
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2010

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