Arbeitspapier
Bank Ownership and Financial Stability
We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions against social welfare, weighted by political accountability.Politicians facing few constraints prefer state control to maximize their rents. As state banks are less efficient, at higher level of accountability there is a shift to private control. At the transition point there is a jumpin risk taking, as private banks do not internalize the social costs of bank failure. To discourage private risk taking, the politician leaves more rentsto private banks.We conclude with some suggestive data complementing existing evidence that financial instability is highest when bank control is capturedby small lobbies.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-022/2
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
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Political Economy
Bank Control
Lobbying
Instability
Bankenaufsicht
Privatisierung
Interessenpolitik
Bankenkrise
Wirkungsanalyse
Neue politische Ökonomie
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Perotti, Enrico
Vorage, Marcel
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
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2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Perotti, Enrico
- Vorage, Marcel
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2010