Arbeitspapier
Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices.
This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a locational model of public goods provision, where jurisdictions are represented by coalitions of consumers with similar tastes, and where the levels of taxation and local public goods provision within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting. We show that in this setting interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 1997-05
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Perroni, Carlo
Scharf, Kimberley A.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
- (where)
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Copenhagen
- (when)
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1997
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Perroni, Carlo
- Scharf, Kimberley A.
- University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
Time of origin
- 1997
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