Arbeitspapier

Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices.

This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a locational model of public goods provision, where jurisdictions are represented by coalitions of consumers with similar tastes, and where the levels of taxation and local public goods provision within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting. We show that in this setting interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 1997-05

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Perroni, Carlo
Scharf, Kimberley A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
(wo)
Copenhagen
(wann)
1997

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Perroni, Carlo
  • Scharf, Kimberley A.
  • University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)

Entstanden

  • 1997

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