Arbeitspapier
"I" on You: Identity in the Dictator Game
We study a giver’s generosity depending on her relationship with the recipient and the observer. We assign different group identities to the players using a variation of the minimumgroup paradigm, and test the effect of group memberships on altruistic giving in the dictator game with a passive observer. The results show that the dictator gives the least when she is from a different group than the other two. We further show that dictators give more when there is no observer. This is driven by male subjects who react more to the presence of the observer.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2019-049/II
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
-
dictator game
observer
group identity
laboratory experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kopányi-Peuker, Anita
Zheng, Jin Di
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kopányi-Peuker, Anita
- Zheng, Jin Di
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2019
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered
Personal identity in the dictator game
Social Identity Strategies in Recent Economics
Identity and Commitment: Sen's Conception of the Individual
Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games
On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games
Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting
Evolution in Games with a Continuous Action Space
The Conception of the Individual in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games
A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects
Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered
Personal identity in the dictator game
Social Identity Strategies in Recent Economics
Identity and Commitment: Sen's Conception of the Individual
Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games
On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games
Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting
Evolution in Games with a Continuous Action Space
The Conception of the Individual in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games
A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects
Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered
Personal identity in the dictator game
Social Identity Strategies in Recent Economics
Identity and Commitment: Sen's Conception of the Individual
Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games
On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games
Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting
Evolution in Games with a Continuous Action Space
The Conception of the Individual in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games