Arbeitspapier

Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered

While most papers_new on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various sources of the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-099/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Thema
experiment
dictator game
team behavior
social preferences

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Luhan, Wolfgang J.
Kocher, Martin G.
Sutter, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Luhan, Wolfgang J.
  • Kocher, Martin G.
  • Sutter, Matthias
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2006

Ähnliche Objekte (12)