A Perfect Marriage: Child-related Pensions and Public Education

Arbeitspapier

In the present paper the effects of different pay-as-you-go pension systems on fertility decisions of a representative household are examined. Thereby, the analysis focuses especially on the interplay of parental quantity and quality decisions, introduced by Becker (1960). As it will be shown, a traditional pay-as-you-go system in either case distorts decisions of parents leading to an erosion of the financial basis of the system. In contrast, the assessment of a child-related pay-as-you-go system is ambiguous. If parents are solely responsible for expenditures on the quality of children, it is inefficient, too. However, if it is combined with a device like public education, optimality can be restored.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Otto-Wolff-Discussion Paper ; No. 2004,02

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Household Behavior: General ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Education and Research Institutions: General
• Thema: Pay-as-you-go ; child-related pension ; quantity and quality of children ; Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung ; Umlageverfahren ; Familienleistungsausgleich ; Bildungsinvestition ; Bildungspolitik ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Voigtländer, Michael
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung (owiwo)
• (wo): Köln
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23835
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ