Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding

Arbeitspapier

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we collected information on the female participants' menstrual cycles. We find that women bid significantly higher than men in their menstrual and premenstrual phase but do not bid significantly different in other phases of the menstrual cycle. We suggest an evolutionary hypothesis according to which women are genetically predisposed by hormones to generally behave more riskily during their fertile phase of their menstrual cycle in order to increase the probability of conception, quality of offspring, and genetic variety. It is in contrast to results by Chen, Katuscak and Ozdenoren (2005, 2009).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 09-11

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Auctions ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Neuroeconomics
• Subject: hormones ; menstrual cycle ; gender ; likelihood of conception ; first price auction ; risk behavior ; competition ; bidding ; endocrinological economics

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Pearson, Matthew ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of California, Department of Economics
• (where): Davis, CA
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58386
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET