Arbeitspapier

General equilibrium dynamics with naïve and sophisticated hyperbolic consumers in an overlapping generations economy

Using an overlapping generations model, this paper describes interactions between naïve and sophisticated hyperbolic discounters in general equilibrium. The naïfes, who overestimate their future propensity to save and hence over-forecast the future equilibrium asset prices, are exploited through capital transactions by sophisticates, who correctly forecast the future asset prices by incorporating the naïfes' mis-forecasts. Due to the capital losses, the naïfe fall into bankruptcy when they are highly present-biased, highly patient, and having a low population density. Under generous conditions, the equilibrium is shown to be globally stable and Pareto inefficient in the ex-post sense.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 886

Classification
Wirtschaft
Exchange and Production Economies
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Subject
Bankruptcy
Hyperbolic discounting
Naïf
Sophisticate
General equilibrium

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ojima, Takeshi
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(where)
Osaka
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ojima, Takeshi
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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