Arbeitspapier

First-mover disadvantage

This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is selected by her opponent rather than by herself. In the model, the buyer has limited wealth and in addition to acquiring one good from the seller can purchase a different good from a competitive market. The positive relation between the values of these goods is what delivers our result.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 127

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mylovanov, Tymofiy
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2005

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13424
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13424-4
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mylovanov, Tymofiy
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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