Arbeitspapier
First-mover disadvantage
This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is selected by her opponent rather than by herself. In the model, the buyer has limited wealth and in addition to acquiring one good from the seller can purchase a different good from a competitive market. The positive relation between the values of these goods is what delivers our result.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 127
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mylovanov, Tymofiy
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2005
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13424
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13424-4
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mylovanov, Tymofiy
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2005