First mover advantages in mobile telecommunications: Evidence from OECD countries

Arbeitspapier

We explore the existence of first mover advantages in mobile telecommunications markets. Building on a data set comprising monthly penetration rates, market concentration, number of active operators, and market shares of 90 followers from 33 OECD countries, we estimate a dynamic growth model. Our analysis delivers five key results. Regarding a follower's longrun market share, we observe that (1) the penetration rate at the time of market entry exerts an inverted u-shaped effect, suggesting the existence of an optimal time for issuing additional licenses for mobile network operation; (2) the concentration rate at market entry exerts a positive effect, implying that it is easier for followers to enter a more concentrated market; (3) both the number of active operators at market entry and the number of currently active operators have a negative impact. Furthermore, we find that a follower's rate of convergence to the long-run market share is (4) negatively influenced by the current market concentration and number of active operators; (5) negatively affected by changes in the penetration rate since market entry, which strongly indicates the presence of substantial first mover advantages for pioneering network operators.

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• ISBN: 978-3-86304-070-3
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 71

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Telecommunications ; Regulated Industries and Administrative Law ; Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
• Thema: First mover advantages ; Asymmetric regulation ; Market share convergence ; Mobile telecommunications ; Mobilkommunikation ; Markteintritt ; Marktanteil ; Schätzung ; OECD-Staaten

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Muck, Johannes ; Heimeshoff, Ulrich
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (wo): Düsseldorf
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65677