Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications

Arbeitspapier

This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome prevails independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A light-handed regulatory policy can induce effective competition. Call prices are close to the marginal cost if the networks are sufficiently close substitutes. Neither demand nor cost information is required. A unique and symmetric call price equilibrium exists under symmetric access prices, provided that call demand is sufficiently inelastic. Existence encompasses the case of many networks and high network substitutability.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 685

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economics of Regulation ; Telecommunications
• Subject: Network Competition ; Two-way Access ; Access Price Competition ; Entry ; Regulation ; Network Substitutability ; Mobiltelefon ; Netzwerk ; Preiswettbewerb ; Gleichgewichtsstabilität ; Regulierung ; Spieltheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Stennek, Johan ; Tangerås, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81171
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET