Market Design with Correlated Valuations

Arbeitspapier

The effects of information on market design are explored in a simple setting where firms have private information about their correlated fixed costs and the government aims to maximize its expected revenue conditional on achieving efficient allocations. Government revenues are higher when the costs are less correlated (or are more of a private value). The reduced correlation increases the firms' information rents, but a change in the information structure also changes the expected market structures with positive effects on government revenues. If the government faces the no-deficit constraint, there are situations where efficient allocations are achieved under asymmetric information but not under symmetric information.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1034

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: market structure ; correlated values ; market design ; government revenue

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Chen, Yongmin ; Wang, Ruqu
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (where): Kingston (Ontario)
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189318
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET