Arbeitspapier | Working paper

Order protection through delayed messaging

Several financial exchanges have recently introduced messaging delays (e.g., a 350 microsecond delay at IEX and NYSE American) intended to protect ordinary investors from high-frequency traders who exploit stale orders. We propose an equilibrium model of this exchange design as a modification of the standard continuous double auction market format. The model predicts that a messaging delay will generally improve price efficiency and lower transactions cost but will increase queuing costs. Some of the predictions are testable in the field or in a laboratory environment.

Order protection through delayed messaging

Urheber*in: Aldrich, Eric M.; Friedman, Daniel

Free access - no reuse

Extent
Seite(n): 43
Language
Englisch
Notes
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion

Bibliographic citation
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Forschungsprofessur Market Design: Theory and Pragmatics (SP II 2017-502)

Subject
Wirtschaft
Volkswirtschaftslehre

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Aldrich, Eric M.
Friedman, Daniel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
(where)
Deutschland, Berlin
(when)
2017

Handle
Rights
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
Last update
21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Aldrich, Eric M.
  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Time of origin

  • 2017

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