Arbeitspapier
Standardization and the Stability of Collusion
We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms' decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 298
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Lambertini, Luca
Poddar, Sougata
Sasaki, Dan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
-
Bologna
- (when)
-
1997
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5012
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Poddar, Sougata
- Sasaki, Dan
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1997
Other Objects (12)
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion
Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion
Collusion Helps Abate Environmental Pollution: A Dynamic Approach
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
R&D-hindering collusion
Cartel Stability, Mark-Up Cyclicality and Government Spending Multipliers
Cartel Size and Collusive Stability with Non-Capitalistic Players
On the Stability of Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria with CSR Firms
Joint Venture for Product Innovation and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion
Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion
Collusion Helps Abate Environmental Pollution: A Dynamic Approach
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
R&D-hindering collusion
Cartel Stability, Mark-Up Cyclicality and Government Spending Multipliers
Cartel Size and Collusive Stability with Non-Capitalistic Players
On the Stability of Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria with CSR Firms
Joint Venture for Product Innovation and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion
Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion
Collusion Helps Abate Environmental Pollution: A Dynamic Approach
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
R&D-hindering collusion
Cartel Stability, Mark-Up Cyclicality and Government Spending Multipliers
Cartel Size and Collusive Stability with Non-Capitalistic Players
On the Stability of Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria with CSR Firms