Arbeitspapier

Jumping the Queue: Nepotism and Public-Sector Pay

We set up a model with search and matching frictions to understand the effects of employment and wage policies, as well as nepotism in hiring in the public sector, on unemployment and rent seeking. Conditional on inefficiently high public-sector wages, more nepotism in public-sector hiring lowers the unemployment rate because it limits the size of queues for public-sector jobs. Wage and employment policies impose an endogenous constraint on the number of workers the government can hire through connections.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13086

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Public Sector Labor Markets
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Thema
public-sector employment
nepotism
public-sector wages
unemployment
queues

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chassamboulli, Andri
Gomes, Pedro Maia
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chassamboulli, Andri
  • Gomes, Pedro Maia
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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