Convexity, Differential Equations, and Games

Arbeitspapier

Theoretical and experimental studies of noncooperative games increasingly recognize Nash equilibrium as a limiting outcome of players‘ repeated interaction. This note, while sharing that view, illustrates and advocates combined use of convex optimization and differential equations, the purpose being to render equilibrium both plausible and stable.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 655

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: noncooperative games ; Nash equilibrium ; repeated play ; differential equations ; stability.

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Flåm, Sjur Didrik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75940
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET