Perfect Uncontrollable Differential Games

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelberg behaviour. We define a class of games where the strong time-consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as 'perfect uncontrollable'. We provide one example based on a model of oligopolistic competition in advertising efforts. We also present two oligopoly games where one property holds while the other does not, so that either (i) the open-loop Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect while the stackelberg one is time inconsistent, or (ii) the open-loop Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are only weakly time consistent.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 509

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Spieltheorie ; Zeitkonsistenz ; Oligopol

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca ; Leitmann, George
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (where): Bologna
• (when): 2004

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4783
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159350
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET