Arbeitspapier
Perfect Uncontrollable Differential Games
This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelberg behaviour. We define a class of games where the strong time-consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as 'perfect uncontrollable'. We provide one example based on a model of oligopolistic competition in advertising efforts. We also present two oligopoly games where one property holds while the other does not, so that either (i) the open-loop Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect while the stackelberg one is time inconsistent, or (ii) the open-loop Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are only weakly time consistent.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 509
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
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Spieltheorie
Zeitkonsistenz
Oligopol
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
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Bologna
- (wann)
-
2004
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4783
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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30.01.0003, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cellini, Roberto
- Lambertini, Luca
- Leitmann, George
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2004