The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges

Arbeitspapier

In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of agents, who mutually prefer each other to their respective partner. Ties in the preferences allow for three different definitions for a stable matching: weak, strong and super-stability. Besides this, acceptable pairs in the instance can be restricted in their ability of blocking a matching or being part of it, which again generates three categories of restrictions on acceptable pairs. Forced pairs must be in a stable matching, forbidden pairs must not appear in it, and lastly, free pairs cannot block any matching.Our computational complexity study targetsthe existence of a stable solution for each of the three stability definitions, in the presence of each of the three types of restricted pairs. We solve all cases that were still open. As a byproduct, we also derive that the maximum size weakly stable matching problem is hard even in very dense graphs, which may be of independent interest

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CERS-IE Working Papers ; No. CERS-IE WP - 2020/7

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Subject: stable matchings ; restricted edges ; complexity

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cseh, Ágnes ; Heeger, Klaus
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
• (where): Budapest
• (when): 2020

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222076
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET