Arbeitspapier
On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules
There is a divisible commodity and money. Each agent has an endowment of the two goods and continuous, monotone, convex preferences over bundles. Agents may benefit from trade. An exchange rule is a mapping that, for each profile of preferences, calculates for each agent a trade that he finds acceptable, given his preferences. It is known that no strategy-proof exchange rule always yields Pareto efficient outcomes. Strategy-proofness, however, is quite strong. We may instead ask: if we insist upon Pareto efficiency, how frequently will the exchange rule be manipulable? We identify a large subdomain, D, of quasilinear economies on which any efficient exchange rule will be densely manipulable. Moreover, we show the set of manipulable economies is non-meagre. For generic economies outside of D, there exist rules that are locally non-manipulable.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 987
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Exchange
incentive compatibility
budget balance
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Tierney, Ryan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Tierney, Ryan
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2016
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