Artikel
On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules
We identify a large subdomain, D, of quasilinear economies on which any efficient exchange rule will be generically (in the Baire sense) manipulable. For generic economies outside of D, we find rules that are locally non-manipulable. The interior of the set D consists of all economies in which competitive equilibrium would prescribe that all agents consume a positive quantity of money. Since we study quasilinear preferences, this is the domain of primary interest. Our locally non-manipulable rules rely on the existence of traders who are willing to sell all of their cash and absorb the imbalances in the trading of the commodity.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 15-38 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Auctions
Market Design
- Subject
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Exchange
incentive compatibility
budget balance
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Tierney, Ryan
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE2549
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Tierney, Ryan
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2019
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Comment on Sven W. Arndt's "On Exchange Rate Dynamics"
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On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules
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Application of Taylor rule fundamentals in forecasting exchange rates
On Exchange Rate Dynamics
Empirical evaluation of weak-form efficient market hypothesis in Ugandan securities exchange
Organization as a nexus of rules: Emergence in the evolution of systems of exchange
Multilateral rules on foreign direct investment
Why multilateral rules on competition are needed
A note on identifying heterogeneous sharing rules
The EU's new competition policy standards: In search of effects-based, economically intuitive or efficient rules?
Comment on Sven W. Arndt's "On Exchange Rate Dynamics"