Strategic analysis of influence peddling

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes Influence Peddling with interaction between human capital transfer and collusion-building aspects in a model, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an optimal division rule for collusion between a sequence of qualified regulators and a firm; (ii) as the regulators increasingly benefit from the collusion, they strictly decrease regulation rates for the firm under collusion while strictly increasing regulation rates for a firm not under collusion; and (iii) post-government-employment restrictions are not effective policies, and an alternative policy can be suggested.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CAE Working Paper ; No. 11-04

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits ; Economics of Regulation
• Subject: revolving doors ; signaling games ; repeated games

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Majumdar, Mukul ; Yoo, Seung Han
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Cornell University, Center for Analytical Economics (CAE)
• (where): Ithaca, NY
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70449
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET