Arbeitspapier
Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games
We study common belief of rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a model of qualitative beliefs. We characterize the three main solution concepts for such games, viz., Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS), Iterated Deletion of Boergers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP), by means of gradually restrictive properties imposed on the models of qualitative beliefs. As a corollary, we prove that IDIP refines IDBS, which refines IDSDS.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 17-5
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Qualitative likelihood relation
ordinal payoffs
common belief of rationality
iterative deletion procedures
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bonanno, Giacomo
Tsakas, Elias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of California, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Davis, CA
- (wann)
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2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bonanno, Giacomo
- Tsakas, Elias
- University of California, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
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