Farsighted rationality in hedonic games

Arbeitspapier

We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which at each possible partition any new coalition can decide the probability with which to form and leave the current partition. These probabilities are commonly known so that farsighted players can decide whether or not to support a coalition's move: they know which future partition, and hence payoffs, will be reached with what probability. We show that if coalitions make mistakes with positive probability, i.e., if they choose probabilities that are always above some e > 0, then there is a behavior profile in which no coalition has a profitable one-shot deviation.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 654

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: abstract games ; hedonic games ; farsighted stability ; coalition stable equilibrium

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman ; Karos, Dominik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (where): Bielefeld
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/249877
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29579246