Arbeitspapier

Why does the WTO have an Antidumping Agreement?

This paper develops a model that offers a plausible interpretation for the empirical observation of diffusion of antidumping (AD) laws amongst WTO members. Contrary to the regnant belief that this proliferation is driven mainly by retaliatory motives, our model shows that adoption and use of AD laws involve a cooperative act amongst WTO members in an infinite horizon game. The diffusion of AD laws need not result in a Prisonner.s dilemma. Instead we show that the AD agreement of the WTO can serve as a risk-sharing vehicle amongst WTO members in response to adverse shocks incurred by domestic producers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: LICOS Discussion Paper ; No. 253

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Neoclassical Models of Trade
Empirical Studies of Trade
Trade and Labor Market Interactions
Thema
Antidumping
non-cooperative games
WTO
proliferation
Antidumping
Außenhandelspolitik
Handelskonflikt
WTO-Regeln
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hartigan, James C.
Vandenbussche, Hylke
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance
(wo)
Leuven
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hartigan, James C.
  • Vandenbussche, Hylke
  • Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance

Entstanden

  • 2010

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