Arbeitspapier

German MPs' outside jobs and their repercussions on parliamentary effort

It is a longstanding debate whether members of parliament (MPs) should be allowed to follow sideline jobs in addition to their mandate. Critics claim that politicians already face binding time constraints and that moonlighting might lead to a neglect of inner-parliamentary duties. The purpose of this study is therefore to investigate whether politicians with more sideline jobs show less effort inside parliament. To address this question, I collected novel data on German members of parliament from 2009-2013. Using a selection on observables approach that controls for legislator ability, I find that higher outside earnings are associated with a significantly lower attendance rate as well as fewer speeches, oral contributions, interpellations and group initiatives. These results are robust to a variety of tests. My findings suggest that time caps on moonlighting along with stricter disclosure rules for outside activities might be necessary.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1340

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Thema
Outside Earnings
Parliamentary Effort
Moonlighting Politicians
German Bundestag

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Arnold, Felix
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Arnold, Felix
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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