Arbeitspapier
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player.s continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents. private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equililibrium payos using those strategies. While such strategies have desirable robustness properties, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1381
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ely, Jeffery
Horner, Johannes
Olszewski, Wojciech
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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2004
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ely, Jeffery
- Horner, Johannes
- Olszewski, Wojciech
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 2004
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