Arbeitspapier
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player.s continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents. private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equililibrium payos using those strategies. While such strategies have desirable robustness properties, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1381
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ely, Jeffery
Horner, Johannes
Olszewski, Wojciech
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ely, Jeffery
- Horner, Johannes
- Olszewski, Wojciech
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2004
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