Arbeitspapier
Revenue Drift, Incentives, and Effort Allocation in Social Enterprises
Revenue drift, where insufficient attention is given to economic, relative to social, goals, threatens social enterprise performance and survival. We argue that financial incentives can address this problem by redirecting employee attention to commercial tasks and attracting workers less inclined to fixate on social tasks. In an online experiment with varying incentive levels, monetary rewards succeed in directing worker effort to commercial tasks; high-powered incentives attract less prosocial employees, but low-powered incentives do not alter workforce composition. Social enterprises combining monetary rewards with a social mission not only attract more workers, but are also able to guard against revenue drift.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 15716
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Business Objectives of the Firm
Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
- Thema
-
incentives
multitasking
experiment
social enterprise
prosociality
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vladasel, Theodor
Parker, Simon C.
Sloof, Randolph
van Praag, Mirjam C.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vladasel, Theodor
- Parker, Simon C.
- Sloof, Randolph
- van Praag, Mirjam C.
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2022
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