Arbeitspapier

The Auctioning of a Failing Firm

This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm doctrine in the EU and US merger laws. I combine an oligopoly model with an 'endogenous valuations' auction model. Thereby, I take into account that, in an oligopoly, a firm's willingness to pay for the assets depends on the identity of the alternative buyer. The main result is that the doctrine leads to cost inefficiencies, due to a 'least danger to competition' (LDC) condition, which favors small, and thus inefficient, firms. In particular, the LDC condition implies that small firms can preempt acquisitions that would lead to both higher producer surplus and higher consumer surplus.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 514

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Thema
Competition policy
Failing firm defense
Auction
Fusion
Wettbewerbsrecht
Insolvenz
Fusionskontrolle
Auktionstheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Persson, Lars
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Persson, Lars
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Entstanden

  • 1998

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