From bargaining solutions to claims rules: A proportional approach

Artikel

Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 32-38 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Thema: bargaining problem ; conflicting claims problem ; proportionality ; bargaining solutions ; claims rules

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel ; Osório, António ; Peris, Josep E.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g6010032
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167933
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ