Salience of Debt and Homebuyers' Credit Decisions

Arbeitspapier

We show how a regulatory disclosure of hidden debt can eliminate a large mispricing in housing. In a setting where homebuyers must combine several sources of debt, they are biased towards hidden loans, especially if they are young, or have no experience in financial investments or home acquisition. By reducing the mispricing of units with hidden debt, the increased salience of debt benefited homebuyers, particularly those that suffered most from it. An average homebuyer could save {dollar}18,000 by acquiring a dwelling with a one standard deviation lower debt. We confirm that lack of salience was the source of the bias, by showing that the regulation nearly eliminated the mispricing.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-82-7553-888-6
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 21/2015

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis ; Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
• Thema: salience ; housing ; cooperatives ; mortgage ; household finance ; mispricing

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Agarwal, Sumit ; Karapetyan, Artashes
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Norges Bank
• (wo): Oslo
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/210088
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ