Arbeitspapier
A Kink that Makes you Sick: the Effect of Sick Pay on Absence in a Social Insurance System
We examine the effect of the replacement rule of a social insurance system on sickness absence. The elasticity of absence with respect to the benefit level is a critical parameter in defining the optimal sickness insurance scheme. A pre-determined, piecewise linear policy rule in which the replacement rate is determined by past earnings allows identification of the causal effect using a regression kink design. Using a large administrative dataset, we find a substantial and robust behavioral response. The statistically significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to the replacement rate in a social insurance system is on the order of 1.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion paper ; No. 97
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
Sick pay
labor supply
sickness absence
paid sick leave
regression kink design
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bockerman, Petri
Kanninen, Ohto
Suoniemi, Ilpo
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (wo)
-
Turku
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bockerman, Petri
- Kanninen, Ohto
- Suoniemi, Ilpo
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Entstanden
- 2014