Arbeitspapier

A Kink that Makes you Sick: the Effect of Sick Pay on Absence in a Social Insurance System

We examine the effect of the replacement rule of a social insurance system on sickness absence. The elasticity of absence with respect to the benefit level is a critical parameter in defining the optimal sickness insurance scheme. A pre-determined, piecewise linear policy rule in which the replacement rate is determined by past earnings allows identification of the causal effect using a regression kink design. Using a large administrative dataset, we find a substantial and robust behavioral response. The statistically significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to the replacement rate in a social insurance system is on the order of 1.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 97

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
Sick pay
labor supply
sickness absence
paid sick leave
regression kink design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bockerman, Petri
Kanninen, Ohto
Suoniemi, Ilpo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
(wo)
Turku
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bockerman, Petri
  • Kanninen, Ohto
  • Suoniemi, Ilpo
  • Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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