Arbeitspapier

A Kink that Makes You Sick: The Incentive Effect of Sick Pay on Absence

This paper examines the effect of the replacement rule of the Finnish sickness insurance system on the duration of sickness absence. A pre-determined, piecewise linear policy rule in which the replacement rate is determined by past earnings allows identification of the effect using a regression kink design. We find a substantial and robust behavioral response. The statistically significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to the replacement rate is on the order of 1.4.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8205

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Thema
sick pay
labor supply
sickness absence
paid sick leave
regression kink design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Böckerman, Petri
Kanninen, Ohto
Suoniemi, Ilpo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Böckerman, Petri
  • Kanninen, Ohto
  • Suoniemi, Ilpo
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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